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International Capital Mobility and Crowding Out in the U.S. Economy:
Imperfect Integration of Financial Markets or of Goods Markets?
ABSTRACT
Conventional wisdom in the field of international finance holds
that the U.S. economy has become so open financiallly as to be
characterized by perfect capital mobility: a highly elastic supply of
foreign capital prevents the domestic rate of return from rising signifi-
cantly above the world rate of return. This view has been challenged
recently by the observation that investment rates are highly correlated with
national saving rates, and the claim by Feldstein and Horioka that this
correlation is evidence of relatively low capital mobility.
The premise of this paper is that the Feldstein-Horioka finding
regarding crowding out in an open economy is strong enough to survive the
econometric critiques that have been leveled against it, but that it need
have nothing to do with the degree of capital mobility in the sense of the
openness of financial markets and the equalization of international interest
rates expressed in a common currency. It is real interest rates that
matter for questions of crowding out, and real interest parity requires not
just that nominal interest rates be equalized expressed in a common
currency, but also that purchasing power parity hold. It is well-known that
purchasing power parity does not in fact hold. Currently, for example, the
dollar is expected to depreciate in real terms. Thus real interest rate
parity fails and crowding out takes place because of imperfect injor





Conventional wisdom in the field of international finance holds that
the U.S. economy has become so open financially as to be characterized by
perfect capital mobility: a highly elastic supply of foreign capital pre-
vents the domestic rate of return from rising significantly above the
world rate of return. This view has been challenged recently by the
observation that investment rates are highly correlated with national
saving rates, and the claim by Feldstein and Horioka that this correlation
is evidence of relatively low capital mobility. The experience of the
United States in the 1980s seems to confirm this challenge. The decline
in U.S. national saving has been partly offset by a capital inflow from
abroad, but the effect has not been large enough to prevent U.S. real
interest rates from rising and to an extent crowding out domestic investment.
The premise of this paper is that the Feldstein—Horioka finding
regarding crowding out in an open economy Is strong enough to survive the
econometric critiques that have been levelled against.it, but that it
need have nothing to do with the degree of capital mobility in the sense
of the openness of financial markets and the equalization of international
interest rates expressed in a common currency. It is real interest rates
that matter for questions of crowding out, and real interest parity
requires not just that nominal interest rates be equalized expressed in a
common currency, but also that purchasing power parity hold. It is
well—known that purchasing power parity does not in fact hold. Currently,—2—
for example, the dollar is expected to depreciate in real terms. Thus
real interest rate parity fails and crowding out takes place because of
imperfect integration of goods markets, not imperfect integration of
financial markets.
Section I presents the issues in the context of crowding out by the
U.S. budget deficit in the 1980s. Section II presents regressions of
investment against national saving on U.S. historical data. Section III
discusses three distinct senses in which the term"perfectinternational
capital mobility" has been used: (1) closed interest parity, (2) uncovered
interest parity, and (3) real interest parity. It also attempts to see
how much of the real interest differential can be explained by expected
real depreciation. Section IV summarizes conclusions.
I. International Capital Mobility and U.S.
Crowding Out in the 1980s
It is a commonplace that the U.S. economy has over its history become
increasingly integrated into world goods markets and financial markets.
As regards goods markets, imports and exports (averaged) as a share of
GNP have risen gradually at an annual trend rate of .096 percent a year
over the last 55 years, reaching 9.1 percent of GNP in the 1980s. 1/
The percentage of the economy consisting of goods and services that are
potentially tradable internationally, as opposed to actually traded, is
of course considerably higher. International competition now reaches
!/ The share averages .0379 for 1929—1944, .0478 for 1945—1973 and
.0897 for 1974—1984. Figures are from IMF data base. These long run
trends in U.S. trade are examined in Lipsey (1984). See also Cooper (1985).—3—
almost everywhere, beyond U.S. manufacturing into agriculture and services.
Long—run trends towards lower transportation costs, lower tariffs, and an
increasingly Integrated world culture, have all played their parts.
U.S. financial markets are considered to be even more closely inte-
grated with the rest of the world than are goods markets. Here the
development of the Eurocurrency market, the removal of capital controls
when the Bretton Woods system ended, and the continued technological
progress in telecommunications and innovation in the banking system
worldwide have all been Important. Indeed the assumption of "perfect
capital mobility" has for 20 years now been standard in models of floating
exchange rates among the United States and most other major industrialized
countries, despite some of the surprisingly strong conclusions that
typically follow from it.
One strong conclusion that Is thought to follow from perfect capital
mobility is that a fiscal expansion has no effects——neither a negative
effect on investment nor a positive effect on aggregate output. The
absence of an effect on Investment arises because a potentially infinite
capital inflow prevents the domestic interest rate from rising above the
world Interest rate, so that none of the crowding out of investment that
is usual in closed economy models occurs. The absence of an effect on
aggregate output arises because the currency appreciates and worsens the
trade balance by precisely enough to offset the gain in domestic demand.
One can see from a money market equilibrium condition that if the interest—4—
rate does not change, because it is tied to the foreign interest rate, and
the real money supply does not change, then real Income cannot change. 1/
The question of fiscal crowding out has become especially topical In
the 1980s because of the large structural fiscal deficits run by the U.S.
federal government. According to some theories an Increase in government
dissaving should be precisely offset by an Increase in private saving, by
people putting aside money to help their children pay future taxes, so
that there is no effect on total national saving. (National saving Is
defined as whatever private saving is left over after the government
budget deficit has been subtracted out.) Whatever one thinks of the
theoretical merits of the argument, the results of the current experiment
seem clear. The Increase in federal dissaving from the 1970s to the 1980s
has not been matched by a rise in private saving. The rate of total
national saving has rather fallen, from 16.1 percent of GNP on average in
the period from 1973 to 1980 to 14.5 percent in the period fom 1981 to
1984. 2/
As a matter of accounting identity, this fall in national saving
must equal the rise in net capital inflow from abroad plus the fall in
domestic investment. The question of interest is how the change is
divided up between the two. There has in fact been a large net capital
inflow, the counterpart of the record current account deficits, but it
There are a number of ways that these strong results can be watered
down. One way particularly relevant for the United States is the large—
country point: to the extent that a fiscal expansion succeeds in driving
up the worldwide interest rate, it will have succeeded in raising income
and crowding out investment (both effects holding abroad as well as
domestically).
2/ The decline in saving net of the capital consumption allowance has
been even more pronounced. See Table 4 in Friedman (1985).—5—
has not been large enough to prevent the investment rate fromfalling,
from 16.1 percent of GNP in the period from 1973 to 1980to 15.4 percent
In the period from 1981 to 1984. 1/
More visibly, the capital inflow has not been largeenough to prevent
U.S. real interest rates from rising sharply, even vis—a—visforeign real
interest rates. There are of course differentways of measuring the real
interest rate. For questions of saving and investment, thelong—term
nominal interest rate is to be preferred over the short—term rate. But
measuring inflation expectations is more problematic in the long term
than in the short term. Table 1 reports measures of long—term real
Interest rates using four measures of expected inflation that are available
for both the United States and major trading partners: a three—year lag
on past inflation (with weights .5, .3, and .2), forecasts by DRI, forecasts
by the OECD, and a survey by American Express of opinions among 250—300
central bankers, private bankers, corporate treasurers and finance directors,
and economists. By any of the four measures there was a clear increase
in the U.S. real interest rate after 1980, both absolutely and relative
to a weighted average of trading partners. The long—term real interest
1/ The average investment rate in the 1981—1984 periodencompasses a
fall in the first two recession years and a rise in the subsequent two
recovery years; investment, like saving, is of course highly procyclical.
There has been talk, especially in 1984, of an investment boom. But
Bosworth (1985) suggests that the favorable effect that the 1981 corpo-
rate tax law changes had on the cost of capital to firms was more than
offset by the unfavorable effect of the increase in real interest rates,
and that any appearances of an investment boom in 1983—85 were due to the
recovery and the existence of new computer technology. See also Friedman
(1985). In any case, it must be that the increase In real interest rates
has acted to depress investment relative to what It otherwise would be.—6—
Table 1. Interest Rate Differentials between U.S. and Foreign Assets,
and Other Measures of the Expected Rate of Dollar Depreciation, 1976—85
(Percent per annum)
1976—781979—801981—821983—84 1985
Expected Nominal Rate of Depreciation
1.1 One—year interest
differential a! —0.48 2.29 3.00 1.73 1.15
1.2 One—year forward discount 0.18 2.57 3.34 1.85 1.32
1.3 Ten—year interest
differential —0.50 0.56 1.91 2.47 2.92
1.4 Economist survey b/ NA NA 8.57 8.60 7.12
1.5 American Express survey c/ 0.64 NA 6.67 6.99 NA
Expected Inflation Rate Differential
2.1 One—year lag —1.01 3.54 0.88 —0.35 0.06
2.2 Three—year distributed lag —1.96 2.70 1.89 —0.18 —0.16
2.3 DRI three—year forecast d/ NA 2.20 0.96 0.23 0.15
2.4 OECD two—year forecast e/ 1.42 2.24 0.62 0.61 —0.20
2.5 American Express survey —0.75 NA 4.11 2.68 NA
Expected Real Rate of Depreciation
1.1—2.1 One—year real interest
differential 0.53 —1.24 2.12 2.09 1.08
1.3—2.2 Ten—year with
distributed lag 1.47 —2.15 0.02 2.64 3.08
1.3—2.3 Ten—year with DRI
forecast NA —1.64 0.95 2.24 2.77
1.3—2.4 Ten—year with OECD
forecast —1.92 —1.68 1.29 1.86 3.12
1.5—2.5 American Express survey 1.39 NA 2.56 4.31 NA
Dividend/Price Ratio / NA 1.10 1.79 1.65 1.80
Earnings/Price Ratio / NA 1.60 3.99 2.60 3.09
a/ Calculated as log (1 +i).1985 contains data through June. Rates for
Japan are not available for 1976—77.
b/ Available at 24 survey dates. (See Table A—2 in Frankel and Froot (1985).)
Source: Economist Financial Report.
c/ Available at 11 survey dates. (See Table A—l in Frankel and Froot (1985).)
Source: American Express Bank Review.
d/ Averages of same 24 dates as in footnote b. Source: DRI forecasts.
e/ 1976—78 is only December 1978. 1985 is June 1985. Source: OECD Economic
Outlook.
f/ Available at same 11 survey dates as footnote c, for the United States, United
Kingdom, and West Germany. Available at only four survey dates (1976—78) for France.
/End—of—quarteraverages. 1979—80 includes data only for 1980. 1985 is end of
quarter 1, 1985. Foreign ratios represent the aggregate of Europe, Australia and
the Far East. Source: Capital International Perspective, Geneva.
Sources for other statistics: IMF International Financial Statistics and Data
Resources, International DRI FACS financial data base.
The foreign variables are GNP—weighted averages of the United Kingdom, France,
West Germany and Japan, unless otherwise specified.—7—
differential stood at about 3 percent in the first part of 1985, as
compared to —2 percent five years earlier.
For those outside the field of international economics, the novel
feature of the 1980s is the magnitude of the U.S. capital inflow and of
its counterpart, the notorious record trade deficits. The unfavorable
effect of the latter on U.S. export and import—competing sectors has of
course received a great deal of attention; and the favorable effects of
the former, keeping interest rates from rising as much as they otherwise
would, have received some attention as well. But for those inside the
field the interesting question is rather, "if capital mobility is as
perfect as we have been assuming, why has there been rise in the real
interest differential; why has the increase In the net capital inflow
not been large enough to prevent crowding out of investment; and why
has the increase in the trade deficit not been large enough to counter-
act the expansionary effects of the fiscal policy so as not to leave
net effect on national income?"
II. Correlations of Saving and Investment
1.The Feldstein—Horioka methodology
Even before the current episode, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) initiated
a controversy on the subject of the implications of perfect capital mobility.
They ran cross—section regressions of investment against national saving,
found coefficients much closer to one than to zero, and interpreted the
results as evidence that capital mobility is in fact far less than perfect.—8—
The argument was that if a country faced an infinitely elastic foreign
supply of capital that prevented the domestic rate of return from rising
above the foreign rate, then random variation in propensities to save or
in government deficits should be fully offset by international capital
flows, and there would be no reason for them to have any effect on invest-
ment rates.
The Feldsteln—Horioka work has been subjected to a barrage of criti-
ques. Virtually all of them are econometric in nature. Little of the
commentary has tried to define better than did Feldstein and Horloka what
precisely is the hypothesis one is seeking to test, or how it relates
conceptually to more conventional definitions of capital mobility based
on rates of return. Doing so is one of the major aims of this paper. 1/
But first we will address some of the econometric critiques of the
Feldstein—Horioka regressions. Consider the national saving identity
with each of its components specified as functions of the rate of return r:
1(r) —NS(r,G) =KA(r_r*)
where I is investment, NS is national saving, KA is the net capital inf low
from abroad, and C is government expenditure, or any other determinant of




dC dG 1 +(rSr)/(r)
1/ Two other papers that discuss both the Feldstein—Horioka notion of
international capital mobility and the more conventional definitions are
Boothe et al (1985) and Obstfeld (1985).—9—
This derivative is in general negative, assuming NS is. But it iszero if
=, andis equal to the closed economy crowding out effect if KAr =0.
There are three basic econometric difficulties with regressions of
investment against national saving. The first, which arises only in time
series studies, is the strongly procyclical nature of both saving and
investment, even when expressed as shares of GNP (as they always are in
these studies). If an exogenous boom causes the saving rate and invest-
ment rate both to rise, we do not want to attribute it to low capital
mobility. For this reason, Feldstein and Horioka restricted their analysis
to cross—section data, as did most who followed in their footsteps. 1/
The second econometric difficulty is the "large country problem": the
United States and other major countries cannot take the world rate of
return r* as exogenous. Even if perfect capital mobility equates the
domestic interest rate to the world interest rate, a fall in domestic
saving will reduce domestic investment to the extent that it drives up
the world interest rate. 2/
The third econometric difficulty is the general one of endogeneity
of the independent variable. The error term in the regression equation
consists of all factors determining investment, other than the rate of
return (and GNP). If they happen to be uncorrelated with the independent
!IOthercross—section studies include Fieleke (1982), Feldstein
(1983), Penati and Dooley (1984), Murphy (1984), Caprio and Howard (1985),
and Summers (1985). However, Obstfeld (1985) used time—series data, as
did Sachs (1981) but with the inclusion of a GNP gap variable.
2/ Tobin (1983), Murphy (1984) and Obstfeld (1985) criticized Feldstein
and Horioka on these grounds.— 10—
variable,there is no problem. But this is unlikely, especially in light
of the identity linking saving and investment. Probably the most popular
criticism of the Feldsteln—Horioka regressions is the "policy reaction"
argument: governments react to current account imbalances so as to reduce
them. For example, if the goverment reacts to a trade deficit induced
by a random increase in investment, by cutting government expenditure or
raising taxes, then national saving and investment will be correlated for
reasons having nothing to do with capital mobilIty. 1/ If endogeneity of
national saving were the only problem, we could invert the equation and
regress national saving against investment; the hypothesis that capital
is in infinitely elastic supply at a given rate of return would still
imply a zero coefficient. This test would be equivalent (given the
national savings identity) to regressing the current account against
investment; the null hypothesis would in that case be a unit coefficient,
implying that any exogenous changes in investment are fully financed by
borrowing from abroad. This in fact is the equation run by Sachs (1981,
1983). But arguments as to why saving should be endogenous apply also to
investment. Clearly the right answer is that national saving, investment
and the current account are all endogenous, and no OLS regression is
appropriate.
If the motivation is to see whether changes in private saving or the
government budget would crowd Out investment in an open economy, then we
1/ The "policy reaction" argument has been made by Fieleke (1982), Tobin
(1983), Westphal (1983), Summers (1985), and Caprio and Howard (1984).— 11—
shouldindeed think of the former as the right—hand side variables and the
latter as the lefthand. But the technique that is required is instrurnen—
tal variables. Total government expenditure is probably not a good enough
instrument because under the policy—reaction argument it is endogenous.
Two better candidates are military expenditure and theage composition of
the population. The former is most immediately a determinant of the
government budget deficit and the latter of private saving. It is possible
to think of ways that either could be endogenous; it is conceivable that
military expenditure could be cut back in response to trade dficjts and
that the age composition of the population could respond to the growth
rate. It is also possible to think of ways that either could affect invest-
ment through routes other than saving and the rate of return. But these
two variables seem to meet the criteria for instruments at least as well
as most alleged instrumental variables in macroeconomics. 1/
2.U.s. saving and investment time series
This section reports Feldstein—Horioka tests on US. data. Econometric
"fix—ups" for each of the three kindsof problems are attempted. But no
claim is made that the results are good tests of the degree of capital
mobility. Indeed, it is argued in subsequent sections that they are not.
This paper in a sense follows in a tradition of others who have criticized
1/ Many of the critiques ignore that the original Feldstein and Horioka
paper used instrumental variables (the four instruments were the ratio of
retirees over 65 to the working age population, the ratio of younger
dependents to the same population, the labor force participation rate of
older men, and the benefit/earning "replacement ratio" under social
security).— 12—
Feldsteinand Horioka and then found the temptation irresistible to do a
few tests of their own on the grounds that the high correlation of savings
and investment is an interesting empirical regularity. 1/
If one is concerned with the worldwide degree of capital mobility or
crowding out, then cross—section studies of the sort performed by Feldstein
and Horioka (1980), Penati and Dooley (1984) and others are appropriate.
However, if one seeks to isolate such parameters for the United States in
particular, and if one wishes to see how they have evolved over time,
then time series regression is necessary. We ran instrumental variables
regressions of investment against national saving for the United States
from 1870 to 1979. We use decade averages of saving and investment
rates, hoping to remove the cyclical variation. The data are graphed In
Figure 1. 2/ One can see that In the 1890s, U.S. investment fell below
national saving, I.e., the country began to run current account surpluses,
lending abroad in particularly large amounts when Europe was dissaving
during World War I. One can also see that both saving and Investment
fell drastically in the Depression, never fully to return to earlier
levels.
Table 2 reports the results of the Instrumental variables regressions.
The coefficient estimate is .96, indicating a very high degree of crowding
1/ E.g., Caprlo and Howard (1984), Obstfeld (1985), and Summers (1985).
2/ All saving and investment numbers used in this paper are gross
rather than net. Harberger (1980) argued that gross numbers bias upward
the Feldstein—HorIoka (1980) coefficients estimates, but Feldstein (1983)


































































































































































































Table2.Instrumental Variables Regression of U.S. Investment
Against National Saving, Decades 1870—1979
Constant Coefficient Time Trend D.W. A.R. R2
in
Coefficients
1. .000 .957 1.5 .91
(.028) (.144)
2. .007 .914 .20 .91
(.914) (.238) (.37)
3. —.025 1.035 .010 1.2 .89
(.083) (.203) (.030)
(Standard errors reported in parentheses.)
Dependent variable: productive capital formation/GNP.
Independent variable: (gross private saving plus increase
in government debt)/GNP
(Source: Ransom and Sutch (1983) Tables 4 and El)
Instrumental variables: Department of Defense outlays/GNP
and population 65 years. of age and over!
population over 20.
(Sources: Series Y 458—460 and Series A 119 and 133, respectively,
Historical Statistics of the U.S.)— 14—
Out("low capital mobility"). Despite the very small number of observa-
tions (11) the standard error is relatively small. Even when we correct
for the (marginal) presence of serial correlation, the estimate Is high
(.91) and we can easily reject the hypothesis of zero crowding out ("per-
fect capital mobility"), though we cannot reject the opposite extreme.
To try to see whether the relationship has changed over time, we added a
coefficient trend term. Its sign is positive, pointing to an increasing
degree of crowding out, but it is not statistically significant, as one
would expect from the small number of observations. 1/
A more recent data set would seem more promising for two reasons.
First, yearly data are available. Second, it is widely believed that the
postwar trend toward increased integration of the economies of the United
States and other countries, both with respect to financial markets and
goods markets, merely reversed sharp movements in the opposite direction
that took place in the interwar period. Thus we look for a trend begin-
ning in the l930s at the earliest.
Table 3 repeats the regressions for yearly U.S. data in the period
1929—1984. In this case, with the greater number of observations,we are
able to reject both extremes of zero and one, even when making the neces-
sary correction for serial correlation. We are also able to identify a
!/ We tried splitting the sample of decade data at 1919 to try to see how
U.S. capital mobility changed over time, but as one would expect from the
very small number of observations the estimates were so imprecise as to
be worthless (—2.69 with a standard error of 2.0, and .75 with a standard
error of .38, respectively). Reliable yearly data are not available
before World War I, aside from the problem of cyclical endogeneity.— 15—
Table3. Regressions of Investment Against National Saving, Yearly Data
Instrumental Variables: Military expenditure/GNP and over65 Population Ratio
I against NS, both as shares ofGNP
Sample
Period



























I againstNS, both as cyclically adjustedshares of GNP
Sample
Period



































* Statisticallysignificant at 95 percent level. (Standard errors reported in
parenthesis.)
Sources: For gross saving and gross private domestic investment, 1985 Economic
Report of the President, Table B—25. For cyclical adjustment: Middle Income
Expansion Trend, Survey of Current Business, December 1983, U.S. Department of

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































statisticallysignificant time trend of .01 per year in the coefficient.
It implies that the degree of crowding out rises over time, from an esti-
mated coefficient of .19 in 1929 (insignificantly different from zero) to
an estimated coefficient of .74 in 1984 (insignificantly different from
unity). An alternative way to see how the coefficient changes over time
is to split the sample. We choose as the breakpoint 1958, theyear when
the European countries restored convertibility of their currencies. The
two coefficients are very similar, .75 in the first half of the sample and
.78 in the second. In both cases we can easily reject a zero coefficient,
but in the 1959—1984 period we are unable to reject a coefficient of unity.
One would expect that the foregoing coefficient estimates would be
biased upward by the cyclical endogeneity problem, because they are not
based on longer term averages. In the second half of Table 3 we report
regressions using yearly saving and investment rates that have been
cyclically adjusted. The cyclical adjustment of each is accomplished by
first regressing it on the GNP gap, defined as the percentage deviation
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis'"middle expansion trend" of GNP and
taking the residuals. The saving and investment rates are graphed in
Figures 2 and 3 for the period 1955—1984. They are more stable than
earlier In U.S. history. 1/ Nevertheless there is enough variation
1/ David and Scaddlng (1974) argue that "Denison's Law," the stability
of private saving as a fraction of GNP in the post—war period, applies
also to preceding U.S. history, despite shifts from personal saving to
durables expenditure and corporate saving. (Their period is 1898—1964.)
But as they point out, the stability of private saving in the face of a
rising and fluctuating government deficit precludes the stability of
aggregate national saving that would be Implied by the theories mentioned
on page 4 of this paper ("ultrarationality").— 17—
tosee that the two series do move together, even after the cyclical
variation has been taken out (Figure 3). The cyclically adjusted invest-
ment and saving rates show a regression coefficient of .81. This is
similar to the estimate for the much longer 1870—1979 period (.91) in
that we can easily reject zero but cannot reject unity. Attempts to find
a postwar trend In the coefficient or a break in the data when capital
controls were removed in 1974 suggest that the coefficient has been moving
closer to one——that Is, that the degree of crowding out has increased (or
the degree of "capital mobility" has fallen). But the standard errors
are too large, probably because the number of observations and the varia-
tion in the data are too small, for the shift to be statistically signi-
ficant.
The failure to reject complete crowding out is the same result found
by Obstfeld (1985, p. 39—43) on quarterly U.S. data. The failure to find
a drop in the coefficient even in the 1970s Is the same result found by
Feldstein (1983) and Penati and Dooley (1984, p. 9—10), and interpreted
by them as contradicting the popular impression of an -increase in the
degree of capital mobility among OECD countries.
Obstfeld (1985) attributes the continued high magnitude of the U.S.
coefficient in the recent period to the large—country problem. It remains
even after the use of instrumental variables and cyclically adjusted num-
bers. The next step is to relate the differential between the U.S. invest-
ment rate and the rest of the world's investment rate to the differential
in national saving rates. Under the null hypothesis, an exogenous fall— 18—
inthe U.S. national saving rate may drive up the world real interest
rate and crowd out investment, but there is no reason for the crowding
out to be reflected in U.S. investment any more than in the rest—of—the
world investment. Such differential saving rates and investment rates
are calculated in Table 4. The close correspondence between U.S. saving
and investment remains: the coefficient in a regression is .740, and is
highly significant despite the small number of observations. 1/
3.What is the meaning of capital mobility?
The apparent finding of a relatively low degree of capital mobility
in the saving—investment studies, from Feldstein—Horioka to the results
just reported, seems puzzling——even startling——to one accustomed to thinking
of capital as perfectly mobile internationally. This is one reason for
the succession of econometric critiques of their paper. The instrumental
variable results are a partial answer to the critiques (more or less con-
vincing according to whether the military expenditure and age structure
variables are considered more or less valid instruments). But even if
one believes that problems of econometric endogeneity remain, as is
likely, It seems intuitively clear that a degree of domestic crowding out
fundamentally exists, that even if truly exogenous changes in national
saving could be isolated they would not be found to be offset one—for—one
by net capital inflow.
1/ The standard error of the coefficient is .172, the RZ is .59, and
the Durbin—Watson is 1.66. The numbers are not cyclically adjusted, but to
the extent that business cycles are internationally synchronized (as they
should be under conditions of high capital mobility), cyclical effects












1970 —.013 —.015 +.004 +.007 —.023
1971 —.020 —.017 +..001 +.012 —.022
1972 —.014 —.018 —.003 +.012 —.009
1973 —.004 —.014 +.007 +.006 —.005
1974 —.008 —.008 +.005 —.009 +.028
1975 —.045 —.021 +.014 —.001 —.008
1976 —.031 —.021 +.004 —.003 +.006
1977 —.024 —.032 —.026 —.006 +.003 —.000
1978 —.014 —.042 —.034 —.006 +.012 —.020
1979 —.007 —.036 —.022 +.001 —.002 +.001
1980 —.023 —.035 —.015 +.003 —.009 +.009
1981 —.022 —.040 —.034 +.004 —.002 —.021
1982 —.048 —.042 —.048 —.001 +.001 —.038
1983 —.054 —.043 —.054 —.010 +.009 —.026
1984 —.048 —.041 —.043 —.025 +.013 —.016
1985 —.052 —.036 —.036 —.032 +.015 —.018— 19a—
Table4b. Saving and Investment in the United States vs. the Rest of the World
2/
Investment/CNP National Saving/GNP I/CNP DifferentialNS/Differential
Other Other United States United States
industrial industrial versus versus
U.S.countriesLDCs U.S.countries LDCs Rest of World Rest of World
1970 .145 .253 .235 .149 .260 .212 —.093 —.070
1Q71lcti 9c 77 icc 9As 71c — nc
1972 .164 .252 .232 .161 .263 .223 —.071 —.068
1973.173 .259 .238 .180 .265 .233 —.069 —.058
1974 .159 .255 .261 .165 .246 .290 —.101 —.118
1975.133 .242 .272 .147 .242 .263 —.134 —.113
1976 .150 .238 .270 .154 .236 .276 —.115 —.115
1977 .169 .236 .275 .163 .239 .275 —.099 —.106
1978 .179 .235 .274 .173 .247 .254 —.089 —.080
1979.175 .236 .265 .176 .234 .265 —.085 —.084
1980 .153 .237 .265 .155 .227 .273 —.108 —.111
1981 .164 .235 .258 .167 .233 .238 —.091 —.070
1982 .135 .225 .246 .134 .226 .208 —.107 —.076
1983 .143 .218 .238 .132 .227 .212 —.092 —.082
1984 .175 .216 .227 .150 .229 .211 —.051 —.064
1985 .174 ... .220 .142 ... .202
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Data Base and International Financial Statistics.
2/ National Saving (NS), calculated as Investment (I) + Current Account (CA)— 20—
Mostreaders of the Feldstein—Horioka paper and subsequent literature
have from the start been vaguely bothered by theconnection, or lack of
it, between their use of the phrase "perfect capital mobility" and the
use of the phrase that existed previously in the field of international
finance. Feldstein and Horioka themselves take pains tosay that they
are talking about long—term, as distinct from short—term, capital mobility:
It is important to emphasize that this conclusion is compatible
with the obvious international mobility of short—term liquid
capital. While a small part of the total world capital stock
is held in liquid form and is available to eliminate short—term
interest rate differentials, most capital is apparently not
available for such arbitrage—type activityamong long—term
investments (p. 328).
One problem with this type of argument is that if short—termassets and
long—term assets are relatively close substitutes within eachcountry,
then international arbitrage of short—term rates of returns would beall
that is required. It may be that short—termtreasury bills are not in
fact close substitutes for long—term bonds, or for equitiesor real
capital within a given country; but i-f. so, this Is not the fault of
international capital mobility.
Penati and Dooley, who generally confirm the findings of Feldstein
and Horioka, come closer at describing the connection with traditional
notions of capital mobility by emphasizing the distinction betweengross
flows and net flows:
...It is not necessarily true that a large volume oftwo—way
trade in financial assets is associated with net trade in
financial assets. But it is the net trade, together with the
associated net trade in goods and services, that allows domestic
investment to diverge from domestic savings (p. 7)— 21—
Thisis clearly right. But the question that remains to be answered is
the following: If there are no barriers to the gross acquisition of
assets across national boundaries, how can there be barriers to the net
acquisition of assets? Is not "gross" capital mobility sufficient to
equalize interest rates? And if it is, how is it that changes in national
saving seem to crowd out investment in their own country?
We turn now to traditional definitions of international capital
mobility, where the operational criteria are stated in terms of differen-
tial rates of return rather than correlations of saving and investment.
Later we will return to the meaning of the correlations.
III. Three Interest Parity Conditions as
Definitions of Capital Mobility
The term "perfect capital mobility" is commonly used in three distinct
ways; in each case the operational criterion is a version of international
interest rate parity.
1. Closed interest parity
The first definition is the absence of important capital controls,
transactions costs, or other barriers separating investors from the assets
they would like to hold. 1/ The operative criterion is that arbitrage
equalizes nominal interest rates on assets located in different countries,
when any exchange rate risk has been removed. This criterion is most
1/ This is the definition of perfect capital mobility that I argued is
the most sensible, to distinguish it from perfect substitutability (the
second definition, considered below) in Frankel (1983); supporting cita-
tions appear there.— 22—
oftenstated as covered interest parity:
i =i*+fd
where i is the domestic nominal interest rate, i" the foreign nominal
interest rate, and fd the forward discount on domestic currency.
For the criterion to be an interesting one, the interest rates should
refer to securities that differ in political jurisdiction, not just in
currency of denomination. The best—known study of covered interest parity,
Frenkel and Levich (1975), found the relationship to hold well for Europound
and Eurodollar interest rates on deposits side—by—side in a London bank.
Indeed if one were to find significant deviations from covered interest
parity with such a data set, one would be less likely to change one's view
of the world than to question the reliability of the data set. The interest-
ing criterion instead uses, for example, London interest rates and New York
interest rates. The London interest rate can be either a Eurodollar rate
(it), or a pound rate (ii) covered on the forward exchange market.
In the former case we would test the condition
-.
(2)i =4
whichwe might call "absolute" or "simple" interest parity. In the latter
case we would test the condition
(3) i14 =i+fd
which is "international" (as opposed to "Euromarket') covered interest— 23—
parity.Given that Euromarket covered interest parity holds,
(4) 4= i+fd,
the other two, more interesting, criteria are identical to each other.
If one phrase is desired for the two of them interchangeably, it might be
"closed interest parity."
Frenkel and Levich (1975, 1977) find that, even for the periods 1962—67
and 1973—75 when Euromarket covered interest parity held well, international
covered interest parity, using U.S. and U.K. treasury bills, held signif i—
cantly less well. They attribute the deviations to what Aliber (1973)
called political risk: default, taxation, capital controls, or any other
sort of risk attaching to the political jurisdiction of a security as
opposed to its currency of denomination. Similarly, Dooley and Isard
(1980) find imperfect capital mobility for Germany during the period 1970—74;
they use mark deposits in Frankfurt versus Euromark deposits in Zurich to
test what we have just called absolute or simple interest parity, and find
large deviations. Like Aliber and Frenkel and Levich, they attribute the
deviations to political risk, specifically allocating primary responsibility
to the level of controls in place in Germany at the time (essentially the
taxation of interest paid to foreign residents) and secondary responsibility
to the uncertainty regarding possible future changes in the level of controls.
Fase (1976) finds large deviations from closed interest parity, both simple
and covered, for the United States, Canada, Germany, and eight other major
countries for the Bretton Woods period 1961—72.— 24—
Germanyand the United States removed most of their capital controls
in 1974. !IUsingGranger—Sims causality tests on simple interest parity
for the dollar (the Eurodollar rate versus the domestic U.S. commercial
paper or treasury bill rate), Hartman (1983) finds a significant strength-
ening of the link from the 1971—74 period to the 1975—78 period. Boothe
et al. (1985, p. 112) find small deviations for the Canadian dollar in
the 1975—82 period.
Britain removed its controls in 1979, so that by the 1980s six indus-
trialized countries——the United States, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom,
Switzerland, and the Netherlands——were perceived as having essentially open
financial markets. France and Italy, on the other hand, maintain serious
controls on capital outflow, as is easily demonstrated by the excess of the
Eurocurrency interest rates In London over the domestic rates in France and
Italy. Giavazzi and Pagano (1985, 27—28) find that the deviations from
covered interest parity are large enough that domestic arbitrageurs would
make guaranteed profits if they could get their money into the Euromarket,
on 85 percent of the days in the case of France (September 1982 —August
1984, with a mean return of 3.99 percent) and 60 percent of the days in
the case of Italy (November 1980 —August1984, with a mean return of
3.51 percent), and that the deviations rise sharply before a devaluation. 2/
1/ Dooley and Isard (1980, p. 382—3), Argy (1982, p. 35, 38, 43, 76—79),
and Baumgartner (1977) give the history of German capital controls in the
197 Os.
2/ Claassen and Wyplosz (1982) and Frankel (1982b) also document the case
for France.— 25—
Theyalso look at Germany and the Netherlands and find deviations that are
opposite in sign to those of France and Italy, but that are In any case
much smaller in magnitude (the mean returns to covered arbitrage are only
0.34 percent for Germany and 0.14 percent for the Netherlands, for the
period September 1982 —August1984).
Of the seven summit countries, Japan Is the one of controversy. In
the late 1970s Japan maintained strict controls on capital Inflow, in order
to resist the large appreciation of its currency that was taking place.
Foreigners were prohibited from acquiring most forms of Japanese securities,
such as gensaki, a three—month repurchase agreement. In May 1979, in the
face of a depreciating yen, the Ministry of Finance removed most of these
prohibitions. The controversy arose in 1983 when some American businessmen,
alarmed by devastating competition from Japanese exporters, convinced the
U.S. Treasury Department that the Japanese government was still using some
form of capital market restrictions to keep the value of the yen lower than
It would otherwise be. There followed a campaign by the U.S. government
to induce the Japanese to adopt a whole list of measues further liberalizing
their financial markets, which came to fruition In the May 1984 Yen/Dollar
Agreement between the U.S. Treasury and the Japanese Ministry of Finance.
This episode Is a good case study in which to apply our closed inter-
est parity criterion for capital mobility. We can compute the differential
between the three—month Euroyen interest rate in London and the gensaki
rate in Tokyo, and compare its magnitude before and after the purported
liberalization. Between the period January 1975 —April1979, and the
period May 1979 —November1893 the mean absolute value of the deviation— 26-
fellfrom 2.06 percent to 0.31 percent and the variance fell from 3.29 per-
cent to 0.22 percent. !I The statistics in Table 5 show that, by the
criterion of closed interest parity, Japanese financial markets are now as
open internationally as those of the United Kingdom, Germany, and Switzerland.
2.Uncovered interest parity
The second definition of perfect capital mobility is the absence of
imperfect substitutability, attributable in particular to risk, between
domestic and foreign assets. The operative condition here is uncovered, or
open, interest parity:
—
whereLse is the expected percentage depreciation of the dollar over the
coming period. In other words, investors respond to any differentials in
expected returns so as to arbitrage them away. In theory, investors should
wish to diversify their portfolios and so should not entirely arbitrage
away such a differential but rather should leave a risk premium, unless (a)
1/ The sign of the deviation switched, from a mean of —1.84 in the first
period to +0.26 in the second period. This is evidencethat, although the
earlier controls acted to prevent capital inflow into Japan (otherwise
investors would not have settled for the Euroyen interest rate in London
when a higher return was available in Tokyo), those controls that remained
after April 1979 acted more to prevent capital outflow (otherwise investors
would not have settled for the interest rate in Tokyo if a higher Euroyen
rate were freely available in London). It is ironic that the United States
in 1983—84 pushed for further Japanese liberalization with the express goal
of strengthening the yen, when liberalization could be expected to result
in greater capital outflow in response to higher interest rates in the
United States, and thus to weaken the yen. The calculations cited here
appear in Frankel (1984, p. 21—24); the numbers are originally from Morgan
Guaranty. See also Otani and Tiwari (1981) and Otani (1983).— 27—
Table5. Financial Openness for Five Countries: Eurocurrency
Interest Rate (Three—Month) Less Money Market Rate
October 7, 1983 to May 1984
JapanUnitedGermanySwitzerlandFrance
1<1 ngdom
Mean 0.053 0.109 —0.041 0.116 1.813
Mean absolute
value 0.101 0.114 0.103 0.161 1.813
Mean Square 0.015 0.017 0.020 0.036 5.071
Variance 0.013 0.005 0.018 0.023 1.783
Source: J. Frankel, The Yen/Dollar Agreement: Liberalizing
Japanese Capital Markets (MIT Press, December 1984). p. 24.— 28—
theyare risk neutral, or (b) exchange risk is completely diversifiable,
both extremely strong assumptions. But the magnitude of the risk premium
is very much an open matter.
Cumby and Obstfeld (1981, 1984) and others have statistically rejected
the hypothesis that the errors made by the interest differential in pre-
dicting exchange rate change are random. Given covered interest parity,
the tests are equivalent to the (more numerous) tests of the hypothesis
that the errors made by the forward discount In predIcting exchange rate
changes are random. In both cases, the standard finding is statistically
significant serial correlation of prediction errors, and even a tendency
for predictions to be incorrect as to the sign of exchange rate changes.
Cumby and Obstfeld, and most others, have concluded from such evidence that
uncovered interest parity fails. But, as they recognize, the tests are in
fact joint tests of uncovered interest parity and rational expectations.
The evidence cannot distinguish which half of the joint null hypothesis is
being rejected.
More information Is needed to try to isolate the risk premiums out of
the noisy prediction errors, i.e., out of the difference between the inter-
est differential and the ex post changes in the exchange rate. The most
natural source for such information is the theory of portfolio optimization
on the part of investors. The theory says that the risk premium ought to
be related to such factors as the degree of risk—aversion, the supplies of
various currencies that have to be held In investors' portfolios, the
variance of the exchange rate In question, and the covarlances with returns
on other securities and with other investment opportunities. Econometric— 29—
testshave looked for a systematic relationship between the prediction
errors and the variables to which the theory says that the risk premium
should be related, and have found no signs of such a relationship. !/ As
always, the statistical failure to reject the null hypothesis of a zero
risk premium could be due to low power in the test. But there is a surpri-
sing, and more far—reaching, point that transcends the particular econometric
technique used to estimate variances and covariances of rates of return.
It is that conventional estimates of the degree of risk—aversion imply that
the risk premium must be very small.
It can be shown that if investors optimize with respect to the mean
and variance of their wealth, they will allocate their portfolios accord-
ing to the following equation:
x a+[PQF'(rpt)
where xt is the share of the portfolios allocated to foreign assets (or a
vector of shares allocated to various foreign currencies); c is the minimum—
variance portfolio, which is closely related to the share of consumption
allocated to foreign goods (or a vector of such shares); p is the coeffi-
cient of relative risk aversion;is the variance (or variance—covariance
matrix) of the return differential, i.e., of the change in the exchange
rate if we are looking at short—term financial assets with known nominal
returns; and rpt is the risk premium on foreign assets (or vector), i.e.,
the ex ante return differential or deviation from uncovered interest
!/Forexample, Frankel (1982a), which also gives further references.— 30—
parity.!/ Intuitively, an increase in the expected return on a particu—
lar asset will induce investors to shift a higher share of their portfolios
into that asset; but the more important investors consider risk diversifi-
cation (that is, the larger is p or P), the less will they shift their
portfolios in response to a given change in expected returns.
The unconditional monthly variance of the relative return on dollars
has been on the order of .001. 2/ The conditional variance, which is
what should matter for investor behavior, must be less than or equal to
the sample variance. Thus we may take .001 as an upper bound estimate
of Q. The coefficient of risk aversion, p, is thought to be in the
neighborhood of two. 3/ Taking the product [pQ], it follows from the
above equation that asset demands are extraordinarily sensitive to the
risk premium. If an increase in the supply of foreign assets Xt equal
to 1 percent of the portfolio is to be held willingly, it will have to
drive up the risk premium rpt by .002 percent on a monthly basis, or a
mere .024 percent per annum——just 2.4 basis points. It also follows
1/ Derivations appear in Dornbusch (1983) for the case of two assets
and stochastic goods prices, Krugman (1981) for the case of two assets
and nonstochastic goods prices, Frankel and Engel (1984) for the case of
n assets and stochastic goods prices and Frankel (1982a) for the case of
n assets and nonstochastic goods prices.
2/ The period is August 1973 to August 1980; Frankel (1985). The cal-
culations assume a constant (conditional) variance.
3/ Friend and Blume (1975) estimate p to be in the neighborhood of two
in the context of investors' portfolio behavior. Stern (1977) provides a
survey of estimates in other contexts, most also in the neighborhood of
two.— 31—
that,the magnitude of the risk premiums, not just the variability, is
very small. 1/
It must be emphasized that the conclusion that international substi-
tutability is very high, and thus the risk premium very small, depends
entirely on the optimal portfolio argument. The hypothesis that investors
diversify their portfolios optimally has not itself held up well to
statistical tests. 2/
If one were to abandon the optimization hypothesis, one would be
hard—put to find other sources of information to help isolate the risk pre-
mium out of the noisy prediction errors made by the interest differential.
About the only apparent alternative is the survey data of exchange rate
expectations that made a brief appearance in Table 1. These data do show
a sizable gap between the interest differential and expected rate of
depreciation, at least for the 1981—85 period of dollar appreciation.
Unfortunately the implied risk premium goes precisely the opposite direc-
tion from that implied by the Cuinby—Obstfeld and other unbiasedness tests
on the interest differential or forward discount data. Those tests all
imply that when the dollar sold at a discount, as it consistently has
during the 1981—1985 period, even though it has not depreciated ex post,
dollar assets must be carrying a positive risk premium. The risk premium
1/ Krugman (1981) and Frankel (1985) show that if pc2 is small, then both
the level of the risk premium and changes are small. More generally, past
tests of biasedness in the forward discount or interest differential have
not found unconditional bias; those who have argued for the existence of a
large risk premium have always specified that it be time varying, so as to
fluctuate between positive and negative (e.g., Hansen and Hodrick (1983)).
2/ Frankel and Engel (1984) reject the international optimization hypo-
thesis in a mean—variance framework. Hodrick and Srivistava (1984) do so
in a more general intertemporal framework.— 32—
constitutessome positive fraction of the interest differential (100 per-
cent of it, or more, in the case of tests that show predictions in the
wrong directions). The natural explanation why dollar assets might carry
a positive risk premium in the mid—1980s is that, as a result of recent
enormous federal budget deficits and current account deficits, the supply
of dollar assets that the market must hold in its portfolio exceeds the
share represented by the minimum—variance portfolio. But the survey data
show that for the 1981—85 period, expected depreciation has consistently
exceeded the interest differential, i.e., the risk premium on dollars is
negative. They do not explain any positive fraction of the systematic
component of the prediction errors.
We will return to the subject of the survey data subsequently. But
for now, especially in light of the fact that the validity of these data
as measures of expectations has yet to win widespread acceptance, we take
the existing theoretical and empirical evidence as suggesting that inter-
national capital mobility is very high, in this second sense of high
substitutability in investors' portfolios and a small risk premium. !I
3.Real interest parity
So far we have concluded that capital is highly mobile between the
United States and the other major countries both in the sense of (1) low
1/ Frankel and Froot (1985) introduces the survey data, tests alterna-
tive specifications for the expectations formation process, and tests the
rational expectations hypothesis. Froot (1985) further Investigates
whether the standard findings of biasedness in the forward discount can
be attributed to a risk premium, and allows for measurement error in the
survey data.— 33—
transactionscosts and capital controls, so that closed interest parity
holds relatively well between U.S. securities and foreign securities
(either denominated in dollars or covered on the forward market), and (2)
low risk premiums, so that uncovered interest parity holds relatively
well also (though the evidence here is more widely disputed). How are
such conclusions to be reconciled with the results of the Feldstein—Horioka
tests in Part II above?
Our third definition of perfect capital mobility is the one that
Feldstein had in mind. It is phrased in terms of real interest rates,
not nominal interest rates. It is, after all, the real interest rate
on which saving and investment are thought to depend. The operational
criterion is real interest parity:
(5) rUS =rUK
where rUS '-us —,ie5,r ,1e, and TeUS and 1UK are the
countries' expected inflation rates. If infinitely elastic international
flows were to tie the domestic real intEerest rate to the world real
interest rate, and if the domestic country were small enough to take the
world real interest rate as given then there should be no crowding out:
exogenous decreases in national saving should not drive up the domestic
real interest rate and discourage domestic investment. In the Feldstein—
Horioka regressions (with valid instrumental variables), the coefficients
should be zero.— 34—
But,especially given the large—country and other endogeneity problems,
a better econometric approach than saving—investment correlations is to
test real interest parity directly. Such tests have been performed for
the U.S. and major trading partners in the recent period, by Mishkin (1982,
1984), Friedman and Schwartz (1982), von Furstenberg (1983), Cumby and
Obstfeld (1984) and Cumby and Mishkin (1984). All find significant gaps
between domestic and foreign real interest rates. Since real interest
parity Is the only definition of perfect capital mobility that could lead
one to expect an absence of crowding out, its empirical failure automatically
explains the finding of crowding out in the Feldstein—Horioka regressions;
no arguments about econometric endogeneity are required. Furthermore,
the general trend in the real interest rate results over time is the same
as the general trend in the Feldstein—Horioka regressions. Mishkin
(1984, pp. 1352, 1354), for example, found even more significant rejections
of real interest parity for the floating rate period after 1973 II than
he did for his entire 1967 II —1979II sample period. This corresponds
to the findings of Feldstein (1983) and Penati and Dooley (1984) that the
crowding—out coefficient did not declined as expected after 1973.
One need not search far for the source of failure of real interest
parity. Even if the first two definitions of perfect capital mobility
hold completely, so that uncovered interest parity holds,
(6) j_*= Ace,
it is necessary also to assume what is sometimes called ex ante relative
purchasing power parity,— 35—
(7)e =,e—
ifone is to derive real interest parity
(8)j— = ffe—
Whetherex ante relative PPP (also describable as "random walk expectations
regarding the real exchange rate") holds is a question regarding the degree
of integration of international goods markets (which is thought to be low),
not the degree of integration of international financial markets.
national portfolio investors have reason to arbitrage away gaps in
tries' nominal rates of return when expressed in a common numeraire; but
they have no reason to arbitrage away a gap between the domestic rate of
return expressed in terms of domestic goods and the foreign rate of return
expressed in terms of foreign goods. Perhaps the central message of this
paper is that, although Feldstein and Horioka are correct about the exis-
tence of crowding out, econometric endogeneity problems notwithstanding,
they are wrong to offer this conclusion as evidence of imperfect capital
mobility. 1/
It might be protested that our first two definitions of capital
mobility refer only to nominal assets——bonds and, especially, shorter
term bills or deposits—— and that a perfectly good third definition would
!/ Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and Feldstein (1983) explicitly refer to
barriers to integration of financial markets. Among the many subsequent
authors who seem automatically to accept the conceptual jump from crowding
out to imperfect financial market integration are Tobin (1983), Murphy
(1984), Caprio and Howard (1984) and Boothe et al (1985). Obstfeld (1985)
and Summers (1985) note the relevance of changes in relative goods prices,
though they phrase the distinction differently from the present paper (or
from each other).— 36—
referto real assets——equities and direct investment. But the same
argument applies. In the absence of significant barriers to mobility or
substitutability (including risk), an international investor should equate
the expected rate of return on equities or real investment in one country
to that in another evaluated in a common numeraire, not each evaluated In
terms of local goods prices. If the real return on a country's equities
were equal to the real return on its bonds, each evaluated In terms of
local goods prices, and if real interest parity held, then the real
returns on equities would be internationally equalized as well. But
given the failure of real interest parity, neither foreign direct invest-
ment nor any other known force will equalize real returns on capital.
Thus equating internationally rates of return on financial assets of
any sort will be not sufficient to equate real interest rates; ex ante
relative purchasing power parity is needed as well.
4.Ex ante purchasing power parity
Not long ago, purchasing power parity was widely accepted. It was
argued on a priori grounds that the Law of One Price should be enforced
at least for traded goods: if automobiles were selling at a lower price
in Germany than in the United States, international arbitrageurs should
buy them in Germany and sell them in the U.S., raising the price in one
country or lowering it in the other until equality was restored. If
PPP were to hold in level form then it would also hold in expected rate
of change form (equation (7)); goods markets would pose no obstacles to
real interest parity.— 37—
Theempirical evidence against PPP in level form is overwhelming.
The enormous real appreciation of the dollar in the 1980s has now convinced
the remaining doubters, but abundant statistical evidence was there all
along. For example, Krugman (1978, p.406) computed for the floating—rate
period July 1973 to December 1976 standard deviations of the (logarithmic)
real exchange rate equal to 6.0 percent for the pound/dollar rate and 8.4
percent for the mark/dollar rate. He also computed serial correlation
coefficients for PPP deviations of .897 and .854, respectively, on a
monthly basis, equal to .271 and .150 on an annual basis. The serial
correlation coefficient is of Interest because it Is equal to one minus
the speed of adjustment to PPP. It may be best not to rely exclusively on
the standard deviation of the real exchange rate as a summary statistic
for the degree of integration of goods markets because It In part reflects
the magnitude of monetary disturbances during the perIod. 1/
Table 6 shows updated annual statistics on the real exchange rate
between the United States and Great Britain. During the floating rate
period 1973—1984, though there Is no significant time trend, there is a
large standard deviation of 15.4 percent. The serial correlation in the
deviations from PPP is estimated at .720, with a standard error of
.248. (The equation estimated is (ert÷1 —t÷1)=AR(ert—rt), where
er is the real exchange rate and er is the long—run equilibrium level,
1/ For example, Krugman found that the standard deviation for the real
mark/dollar exchange rate during the German hyperlnflation, February 1920
—December1923, was much larger (20.8) percent) than during the 1970s,
even though the serial correlation was no higher (.765).— 38—
Table6. Purchasing Power Parity Between the United States and the United Kingdom
The Real Exchange Rate in $perL














































(with constant term and
Cochrane—Orcutt correction
for autocorrelation)
auto co r re la t ion
coefficient .874 .970 .984 .991
*Signlficant at the 95 percentlevel (standard errorsreported in parentheses).— 39—
alternativelyestimated as the sample mean or a time trend, and AR is the
autoregressive coefficient.) This means that the estimated speed of
adjustment to PPP is .280 per year and that we can easily reject the
hypothesis of instantaneous adjustment.
From the ashes of absolute PPP, a phoenix has risen. In response to
findings such as those reported here, some authors have swung from one
extreme, the proposition that the tendency of the real exchange rate to
return to a constant is complete and instantaneous, to the opposite
extreme that there is no such tendency at all. The hypothesis that the
real exchange rate follows a random walk is just as good as the hypothesis
of absolute PPP for implying ex ante relative PPP. But there is (even)
less of an a priori case why PPP should hold in rate of change form than
in the level form.
Roll (1979) has claimed that the random walk model of the real
exchange rate has a basis in efficient markets theory. His argument is
apparently that if the expected Inflation rate is lower in the United
States than In Germany, allowing for expected exchange rate changes, then
an arbitrageur can contract to buy authmobiles In the United States and
ship them to Germany and expect to sell them there at a higher price; such
profitable arbitrage would then eliminate the opportunity to begin with,
enforcing PPP in expected rate—of—change form. If this arbitrage is
intended to be different from the old arbitrage in level form which has
been empirically rejected, and Roll clearly intends it to be different,
then it is a remarkable strategy to recommend to international traders.
Measures of expected real depreciation of the dollar as of 1985 show a— 40—
short—termdepreciation rate of about 1.0 per cent per annum. As of 1985,
the level of BMW prices is said to be almost twice as high in the United
States as in Germany, as a result of the five—year appreciation of the
dollar against the mark. Yet Roll's apparent strategy tells us to buy
BMWs in the United States and ship them to Germany because in the three
months it takes to complete the shipment their relative prices will have
increased 0.25 percent in expected value! The near—SO percent loss would
seem to outweigh the 0.25 per cent gain.
Even though ex ante relative PPP has little basis in theory, it does
appear to have some empirical support. Typically, the estimated speeds
of adjustment during the floating rate period, .27 or .28 on an annual
basis in Table 6 (1973—84), while not so low as to be implausible as point
estimates, are so low that one statistically cannot reject the hypothesis
that they are zero. In other words, one cannot reject the hypothesis
that the autoregression coefficient is 1.0.
A 95 percent confidence interval on the autoregressive coefficient
covers the range 0.17 to 1.27 (in the no—trend case). -Ifthe null hypo-
thesis is an autoregression coefficient of 1.0, one cannot legitimately
use the standard t—test derived from a regression where the righthand—side
variable is the level of the real exchange rate, because under the null
hypothesis its variance is infinite. (This does not invalidate the t—test
reported above of the null hypothesis that the tendency to return to PPP was
100 percent, i.e., AR =0.)There are number of ways of dealing with this
nonstationarity problem. Here we simply apply the corrected Dickey—Fuller
cumulative probablility distribution for this problem. The t—ratio to— 41—
testan autoregressive coefficient of 1.0 is 1.13, which falls far short
of the Dickey—Fuller 95 percent significance level, 3.00.
This failure to reject a random walk in the real exchange rate is
the same result found by Roll (1979), Frenkel (1981, p.699), Darby (1981),
and Mishkin (1984, p.1351—53). Most of these studies used monthly data.
On the one hand, the more abundant data reduces the standard error of the
estimate but, on the other hand, one is no longer testing whether AR =.28
is different from 1.0, but rather whether, say AR 1/12 =.90is different
from 1.0, so that it may not be much easier to reject. Another problem
is that one cannot be sure that the nature of the true autoregressive
process is first—order on a monthly (or continuous—time) basis; the
typical finding is that computations on monthly data imply a somewhat
more rapid speed of adjustment when annualized than do computations
performed directly on annual data, suggesting that the process may not be
exactly first order. In any case, the monthly data in the studies cited
were generally not powerful enough to reject the random walk. 1/ As
Frenkel says, "it is concluded that the deviations from purchasing power
parities seem to follow a first—order,- autoregressive-process, but that
the data do not provide sufficient evidence to reject the alternative
hypothesis of a random walk."
A more promising alternative is to choose a longer time sample.
Table 6 reports also statistics for the entire post—war period 1945—1984.
!/ Cumby and Obstfeld (1984, p. 146) used a Q—statistic to test for
higher order serial correlation in monthly real exchange rate changes
and found none. However, they also found that expected inflation differ-
entials are unrelated to expected exchange rate changes, rejecting the
random walk characterization of the real exchange rate.— 42—
PPPheld slightly better during the Bretton Woodsyears than it did after
1973, as measured either by the mean absolute deviation and standard
deviation of the real exchange rate, or by the ability toreject the
hypothesis of zero autocorrelation. But, despite the longer time sample,
we are still unable to reject the random walk. The 95 percent confidence
interval runs from .65 to 1.01, and the t—ratio of 1.9 falls short of the
Dickey—Fuller 95 percent significance level of 2.93.
In the last column of Table 6 we present the statistics foran
entire 116 years of TJ.S.—U.K. data. With this long a time sample, the
standard error Is reduced considerably. The rejection of no serial cor-
relation in the real exchange rate is even stronger than in the shorter
time samples. More importantly we are finally able to detect a signifi-
cant tendency for the real exchange rate to regress to PPP, at a rate of
14 percent a year. The confidence interval for AR runs from .77 to.95,
safely less than unity, and the t—ratio of 2.92 exceeds the Dickey—Fuller
significance level 2.89.
The last row of the Table reports regressions of the real exchange
rate against the nominal exchange rate. The coefficient is highly
significant for the 1864—1984 period. The figuressuggest that changes
in the nominal exchange rate (for example, dueto devaluations under
fixed exchange rates or monetary disturbances underfloating exchange
rates) cause transitory changes in the real exchange rate becausegoods
prices are sticky. Such results specifically rule out the possibility,
which is suggested occasionally in the literature, thatapparent devia—
tions from PPP might be attributed to random measurement errors in the
price data.— 43—
Inthis paper, our motivation for looking at PPP is to obtain insight
into the "expected rate of real depreciation," because that is the variable
that separates the real interest differential from the risk premium. In
rejecting the random walk description of the real exchange rate, we have
rejected the claim that the rationally expected rate of real depreciation
is zero.
The rationally expected rate of real depreciation estimated from a
specific time series process is in any case not necessarily the same as
the actual expectation of real depreciation held by investors. People
could be either less sophisticated or more sophisticated than the auto-
regressive model.
In Table 7 we use the Economist and American Express survey data on
expectations of exchange rate and price level changes to compute a direct
measure of expected real depreciation for the dollar against five individual
currencies, and regress it against a measure of current real "overvaluation."
Overvaluation is the difference between the current exchange rate and a
long—run equilibrium rate calculated by PPP, using as the base the average
of the period 1973—1980. The equilibrium measure differs from a constant
in that it evolves over time at the rate of the inflation differential,
and in that when the regression period is confined to the period 1981—1984,
as is necessarily the case for the Economist data set, it shows a large
real overvaluation throughout. According to the results in Table 7,

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































exchangerate will regress back toward PPP. 1/ The constant term is also
statistically significant. 2/
We can take point estimates from Table 6 to illustrate what a typical
magnitude might be for the rationally expected rate of real depreciation
even in the absence of any expected changes in the long—run equilibrium
terms of trade. For the 1869—1984 period a one percent deviation from
PPP, say an "overvaluaton" of the currency, 1mples a ratIonally expected
rate of subsequent real depreciation equal to 0.14 percent per year. Since
the mean absolute deviation from PPP is 9.3 percent, the mean absolute
value of the rationally expected rate of real depreciation is 0.14 x 9.3
=1.3percent. In the post—1973 period of larger exchange rate fluctua-
tions, the magnitude of expected real depreciation is larger. The most
dramatic case is 1984 or 1985, when calculations of real overvaluation
of the dollar (relative to PPP) on the order of 30 percent imply that the
rationally expected rate of future real depreciation back toward PPP is
large enough to explain all of the real interest differential, calculated
in the various ways of Table 1. 3/
1/ Because the data sample is pooled time series cross—section, there
is certain to be correlation of the error term across different currencies.
The system should be estimated by Seemingly Unrelated Regressions, as Is
done in Franke]. and Froot (1985).
2/ The American Express data set covers a longer time period, 1976—1984,
but fewer observations. The addition of a dummy variable for the strong—
dollar period after 1980 eliminates the significance of the regressive
coefficient. The results without the dummy variable are significant, but
not reported in Table 7.
3/ The 1984 Economic Report of the President, Chapter 2, found that
the expected future real depreciation implicit in the real interest
differential roughly coincided with the "real overvaluation" Implied by the
PPP. But any such calculations are very sensitive to the term of maturity
chosen.— 46—
Amore precise decomposition of the real Interest differential into a
risk premium and expected real depreciation, based on the assumption of
rational expectations and the use of ex post data, is difficult. The
reason is that the difference between the expected exchange rate change and
the ex post exchange rate change, even though random if expectations are
rational, is so large as to reduce greatly the precision of any estimates,
as Mishkin (1984a) notes. Indeed it was for this reason that Mishkin was
unable to reject the hypotheses of a zero risk premium or of zero expected
real depreciation considered individually, even though he could easily
reject the joint null hypothesis in a test of real interest parity, where
the exchange rate expectation errors do not interfere.
It should be recalled from Section 111.2 above that, on the one hand,
the standard tests of unbiasedness in the forward discount or interest
differential say that the rationally expected rate of depreciation is
significantly less than that Implied by the interest differential, and on
the other hand that economists' notions of a long—run equilibrium for the
dollar, as embodied for example In the Economist and American Express survey
data, imply that the expected rate of depreciation as of 1985 is considerably
greater. One cannot prove that expected real depreciation explains 100
percent of the real interest differential, no less and no more. But the
calculations of this section are intended to show that plausible magnitudes
for the former correspond to plausible magnitudes for the latter, and
that deviations from the assumption of perfect capital mobility in the
senses of definitions (1) or (2) are not needed to explain deviations
from real interest parity.— 47—
IV.Conclusions
Regressions of the investment rate against the national saving rate
give results for U.S. time series similar to those obtained by Feldstein—
Horioka and others for cross—section data: a point estimate on the order
of .8, significantly different from zero and insignificantly different
from 1.0. Econometric problems abound, but cyclically adjusting the
saving and investment numbers, using Instrumental variables or working in
terms of deviations from world levels does little to reduce the coefficient
estimate. The estimate has, if anything, been moving closer to 1.0 in
the postwar period. It seems that international capital mobility does
not fully prevent exogenous changes in the government budget or in private
saving from crowding Out domestic investment.
This paper has argued that neither econometric problems nor imper-
fect capital mobility are needed to explain the crowding—out estimates.
"Perfect capital mobility" has multiple definitions: (1) closed interest
parity, requiring insignificant barriers such as transactions costs and
capital controls; (2) uncovered Interest parity, requiring also small
exchange risk premiums; and (3) real interest parity, requiring also ex
ante relative purchasing power parity. Each criterion can be tested
directly. Closed interest parity is observed to hold well among eight of
the major industrial countries. Uncovered interest parity is more difficult
to test, because investors' exchange rate expectations are not directly
observable; nevertheless some theoretical considerations and some evidence
from survey data both contradict the view that a large positive component
of the interest differential (or forward discount) on the dollar constitutes
a risk premium. Thus the first two criteria, the ones that are most— 48—
properlyassociated with the degree of integration of financial markets,
do seem to hold to within relatively small margins. Real interest parity,
the only condition that might lead one to expect an absence of crowding
out, is also the condition that clearly fails empirically. This is not
surprising, since purchasing power parity is well—known to fail empiri-
cally and the argument that ex ante relative PPP could hold nevertheless
is extremely weak on both theoretical grounds and empirical grounds.
When 116 years of data on the U.S.—U.K. real exchange rate are used, it
is possible to reject the random walk characterization, to find a statis-
tically significant speed of adjustment to PPP.
Thus expected real depreciation is an important variable. It seems
possible to attribute all of, for example, the 3.0 percent U.S. real
interest differential as of 1985, to expected real depreciation, rather
than to a risk premium. This implies that it is possible to attribute
the existence of crowding out in an open economy to imperfect integration
of goods markets, rather than necessarily to imperfect integration of asset
markets as has been suggested in the past.— 49—
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